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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the role of commercial banks’ governance mechanisms in financial 
performance and loan quality. The research draws upon corporate governance theory, 
agency theory, and information asymmetry. Fuzzy-set QCA was used to analyze a sample 
of 32 commercial banks listed in the UK. Data referred to the pre-crisis period. Results 
confirm that different combinations of governance mechanisms can yield similar financial 
performance and loan quality. This research contributes to a better understanding of the 
relationships among banking governance mechanisms, financial performance, and loan 
quality. The paper also has practical implications because it identifies alternative 
governance solutions for the commercial banking sector. 
Keywords: corporate governance, agency theory, financial performance, loan quality, 
commercial banks, fuzzy-set QCA 
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INTRODUCTION 
According to Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Peria 
(2011), SME financing is an attractive topic, 
given the importance of SMEs and the 
financial constraints they face. In most 
countries, banks are the main source of 
external financing for SMEs (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2008). The 
2007–2009 international financial crisis led to 
the credit crunch, causing financing 
difficulties for SMEs. Small firms were the 
worst affected because they struggled to find 
alternative financing sources (Iver, Pedydro, 
da-Rocha-Lopes, & Schoar, 2013). The 
intervention of central banks and governments 
(Friedman, 2011) was required to protect the 
financial system and restore confidence in the 
market (Zingales, 2008). 
Evidence suggests that financial institutions 
report neither high risks—especially in terms 
of lending (loan type and volume)—nor the 
effects of these risks on their activities. Hence, 
the corporate governance system, which 
should guarantee providers of finance a return 
on their investment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), 
has been compromised. This failure to report 
risk, together with other high-level 
governance shortcomings, has brought into 
question the corporate governance models 
adopted by financial institutions. A strong 
corporate governance system reduces agency 
problems that arise from information 
asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders (Walkner, 2004). These issues 
are addressed by the corporate governance 
view and are covered by agency theory and 
information asymmetry. 
Despite the importance of commercial banks, 
especially regarding SME financing, research 
on banks’ corporate governance is scarce. A 
better understanding of banking activity is 
necessary. This means applying specific and 
generic performance indicators to banking 
activity. Empirical governance studies still fail 
to explain the performance of banks (Adams 
& Mehran, 2003; Grove, Patelli, Victoravich, 
& Xu, 2011; Felício, Ivashkovskaya, 
Rodrigues, & Stepanova, 2014). In a study of 
US banks before the financial crisis, Grove et 
al. (2011) found that weak governance 
practices led to risky lending decisions. This 
finding is consistent with the literature on 
weak corporate governance (e.g., Black, Jang, 
Kim, & Mark, 2002). 
This research evaluates how well different 
governance mechanisms achieve strong 
financial performance and ensure high-quality 
lending by commercial banks listed in the 
United Kingdom. The objectives of this study 
are as follows: (1) to examine the relationships 
among governance mechanisms, financial 
performance, and loan quality; (2) to verify if 
strong financial performance may be 
associated with several alternative governance 
mechanisms; (3) to understand if the quality of 
loans issued by commercial banks may be 
associated with several alternative governance 
mechanisms. We answer the following 
research questions: Are commercial banks’ 
governance mechanisms related to financial 
performance and risky lending practices? If 
such a relationship exists, is there a unique 
solution or do alternative solutions exist? To 
explore these issues, we focused on 
commercial banks listed in the UK (London 
Stock Exchange) before the sub-prime crisis. 
The sample consisted of 32 commercial banks. 
Analysis was conducted using fuzzy-set QCA. 
Section 2 describes the theoretical background 
and propositions. Section 3 explains the 
method. Section 4 presents the empirical 
results and analysis. Section 5 discusses these 
results. Finally, section 6 offers conclusions 
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and contributions, and section 7 discusses 
limitations and future research opportunities. 
Theoretical background and propositions 
 Corporate governance 
Corporate governance refers to “the set of 
mechanisms that influence the decisions made 
by managers when there is a separation 
between ownership and control” (Larcker, 
Richardson, & Tuna, 2007). Governance 
mechanisms are indirect control instruments 
that shareholders use to reduce agency 
problems between shareholders (principals) 
and managers (agents) by influencing 
managers’ behavior (Deshmukh, 2005; Chen, 
Chung, Lee, & Liao, 2007). McNulty, 
Florackis, & Ormrod (2013) report that 
“corporate governance is designed to reduce 
asymmetric information, control managerial 
opportunism, and redirect management 
toward optimal behavior.” Typically, the 
research on corporate governance “examines 
whether different corporate governance 
structures impact or limit the behavior of 
executives and/or have an impact on 
organizational performance” (Larcker et al., 
2007). 
Corporate governance studies typically use 
agency theory to describe the relationship 
between shareholders and managers 
(Finegold, Benson, & Hecht, 2007; Renders & 
Gaeremynck, 2012). According to agency 
theory, managers use salaries and other forms 
of compensation to control corporate earnings 
to the detriment of shareholders (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997; Miller, Wiseman, & Gomez-
Mejia, 2002). Information asymmetry 
(Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Kennedy, 
Sivakumar, & Vetzal, 2006) refers to 
situations where managers, shareholders, or 
other agents gain access to valuable, 
privileged information and use it for their own 
advantage or in the interests of others. The 
asymmetry of information in a firm greatly 
affects that firm’s governance mechanisms. 
Size, composition, and functioning of the 
board of directors are important corporate 
governance mechanisms. We analyzed the 
governance factors of blockholders, board 
size, affiliated directors, and busy directors 
and formulated the following propositions: 
Proposition 1: Different combinations 
of governance factors (blockholders, 
board size, affiliated directors, and 
busy directors) lead to strong financial 
performance. 
Proposition 2: Different combinations 
of governance factors (blockholders, 
board size, affiliated directors, and 
busy directors) lead to high loan 
quality. 
Blockholders 
The presence of blockholders can mitigate 
agency problems (Pawlina & Renneboog, 
2005). The presence of large shareholders 
reduces information asymmetry and improves 
long-term performance (Pawlina & 
Renneboog, 2005; Florackis & Ozkan, 2009). 
Large shareholders supervise the management 
effectively (Gul, Kim, & Qiu, 2010; Lin, Ma, 
Malatesta, & Xuan, 2011; Jiang, Habib, & Hu, 
2011). Institutional investors (pension funds, 
investment trusts, and mutual funds) often 
play an active role in management control 
(Daily and Dalton, 1994; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). Blockholders often agree on decisions 
such as hiring managers, influencing vote 
initiatives, obtaining higher returns for 
shareholders (Smith, 1996), aligning 
shareholders’ and managers’ interests (e.g., 
through remuneration) (Hartzell & Starks, 
2004; Core et al., 1999), influencing financial 
reporting (Rajgopal & Venkatachalam, 1997; 
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Shang, 2003), and improving future 
operational performance (Larcker et al., 
2007). 
Elyasiani and Jia (2008) report that the 
ownership stability of institutional investors is 
positively associated with financial 
performance and that institutional 
participation promotes good performance. 
This is even more important in commercial 
banks considering that depositors can reduce 
the influence of institutional investors through 
deposit insurance, which makes institutional 
investors a factor in strong corporate 
governance. We thus formulate the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 1a / Proposition 2a: The 
presence of blockholders in a 
commercial bank’s ownership 
structure leads to strong financial 
performance and high loan quality. 
 Board size 
A large board of directors is beneficial in the 
sense that it makes expertise and resources 
more readily accessible to firms (Dalton, 
Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999). Nonetheless, 
other authors argue that large boards impair 
firm performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2003). Large boards make it more difficult to 
effectively monitor the management because 
they offer greater opportunities for shirking 
and delay decision-making (Jensen, 1993). 
Harris and Raviv (2008) stress that, unlike 
outsiders, board members have valuable 
information that can affect corporate 
governance choices. Larger firms may face 
fewer information asymmetry problems than 
smaller firms because larger firms tend to be 
more mature when adopting disclosure 
policies and actions (Diamond & Verrecchia, 
1991; Harris, 1994). Dermine (2013) 
highlights the importance of the relationship 
between the quality of governance 
mechanisms and the size of boards in the 
banking sector. Banks have larger boards than 
manufacturing firms, and the larger boards in 
banks are positively associated with return on 
assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q (Adams & 
Mehran, 2003; Belkhir, 2009). We thus 
formulate the following proposition:  
Proposition 1b / Proposition 2b: A 
large board at a commercial bank 
leads to strong financial performance 
and high loan quality. 
Affiliated directors 
Literature and corporate governance 
recommendations often focus on the role of 
independent directors. Van Essen, Engelen, & 
Carney (2013) report the importance of 
directors’ independence, claiming that the 
clear separation between these directors and 
insiders or major shareholders ensures that 
directors can independently assess the 
management. Following this reasoning, a 
higher percentage of independent directors 
would be beneficial. However, there are 
several definitions of independence, and 
access to reliable data on independence is 
often limited. Hence, several authors propose 
alternative variables to assess board members’ 
ties to the firm. Larcker et al. (2007) overcame 
problems arising from defining independence 
and accessing data on independence by 
studying affiliated directors. Daily and Dalton 
(1994) highlight the importance of outside 
directors and their contribution toward 
holding active discussions, giving critical 
assessment, and sharing expertise and advice 
with the CEO. Valenti, Mayfield, and Luce 
(2010) stress the importance of outside board 
members, focusing on access to valuable 
resources. 
Director independence is important not only 
for the board of directors itself, but also for the 
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committees within the board (e.g., the audit 
committee and the compensation committee). 
A greater percentage of affiliated or inside 
directors on the audit committee is associated 
with a lower likelihood of an auditor issuing a 
going concern report (Carcello & Neal, 2000) 
and a low quality of earnings (Klein, 2002; 
Vafeas, 2005). Zhou and Chen (2009) report 
that an independent audit committee is 
important for constraining earnings 
management with respect to banks’ loan loss 
reserves. Given the discretionary nature of 
several items on banks’ financial statements, 
an independent audit committee is crucial.  
Compensation committees are impartial 
delegations that establish executives’ and 
directors’ compensation. Klein (2002) found a 
positive relation between earnings 
management and the presence of the CEO on 
the compensation committee. Newman and 
Mozes (1999) found that CEOs receive 
preferential treatment when insiders are 
members of the compensation committee. 
Affiliated directors on the compensation 
committee may be under the influence of top 
executives and may thus seek to establish a 
compensation package that favors these 
executives. This argument applies to banks, 
too, according to recent claims that executive 
compensation was a key factor underlying the 
subprime crisis (Bicksler, 2008; Colvin, 
2008). We thus formulate the following 
proposition: 
Proposition 1c / Proposition 2c – The 
absence of affiliated directors on the 
board of a commercial bank leads to 
strong financial performance and high 
loan quality. 
Busy directors 
Supposedly, busy directors monitor the 
management less actively than directors who 
sit on few boards do. Nevertheless, Cashman, 
Gillan, and Jun (2012) point out the lack of 
consensus regarding the effect of busy 
directors on performance. In fact, the 
relationship between busy directors and 
performance may be non-linear (Jiraporn, 
Singh, & Lee, 2009) because of reputational 
effects. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) 
found that the number of busy directors 
correlates positively with CEO pay. Ferris, 
Springenberg, & Hutter (2003) found that 
serving on multiple boards fails to affect the 
director’s ability to carry out board member 
responsibilities. Harris and Shimizu (2004) 
found that busy directors are important 
sources of knowledge and improve acquisition 
performance. Cashman et al. (2012) report 
that whether or not busy directors affect 
performance may owe to firm size, 
highlighting the importance of controlling for 
firm fixed effects. After including fixed 
effects in the analysis, Cashman et al. (2012) 
found a negative relationship between busy 
directors and performance. We thus formulate 
the following proposition: 
Proposition 1d / Proposition 2d: The 
absence of busy directors on the board 
of a commercial bank leads to strong 
financial performance and high loan 
quality. 
METHODS 
Research model and propositions 
The research model (Figure 1) was used to 
explore how different combinations of 
governance factors affect financial 
performance (Larcker et al., 2007; Grove et 
al., 2011; Felício et al., 2014) and loan quality 
(Grove et al., 2011). 
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Figure 1. Research model and propositions 
Attributes and variables 
The governance factors (attributes) chosen for 
this research were based on factors discussed 
by Larcker et al. (2007), Grove et al. (2011), 
and Felício et al. (2014). The research model 
had four attributes (resulting from 13 
observable variables) and two outcomes. The 
attributes were blockholders, board size, 
affiliated directors, and busy directors. The 
outcomes were financial performance, 
measured by return on assets (ROA), and loan 
quality, measured by non-performing assets 
ratio (NPAR). The governance data were 
gathered manually from annual reports, and 
the outcome variables were collected from the 
Bankscope database. 
Blockholders 
We defined a blockholder as a shareholder 
with 5% or more of the company’s shares 
(Larcker et al., 2007). Concentration of 
shareholdings is potentially related to strong 
governance as larger shareholders may have 
the necessary resources and incentives to 
monitor the management. This factor 
comprised the variables percentage of shares 
owned by blockholders, number of 
blockholders, and percentage held by largest 
blockholder (institutional). 
Board size 
Board size comprised the number of members 
on the compensation committee, the number of 
members on the audit committee, and the 
number of members on the board of directors 
(Larcker et al., 2007). The size of boards and 
committees may increase diversity, 
knowledge, and experience but may hinder 
coordination. 
Affiliated directors 
Affiliated directors comprised the variables 
percentage of affiliated members of the audit 
committee, percentage of affiliated members 
of the compensation committee, affiliated 
audit committee chair, and affiliated 
compensation committee chair (in the latter 
two variables, the dummy variables were 
equal to 1 if the chairperson was affiliated, and 
0 otherwise) (Larcker et al., 2007). We 
assumed that affiliated members were under 
the influence of the executive members of the 
board. 
Busy directors 
Busy directors comprised the variables 
percentage of busy outside directors, 
percentage of busy affiliated directors, and 
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percentage of busy inside directors. A busy 
director was defined as a director sitting on 
four or more boards simultaneously (Larcker 
et al., 2007). Although this greater experience 
may be useful, it may limit the time the 
director can dedicate to duties on each board. 
Outcomes 
As per Grove et al. (2011), we considered two 
outcome variables for the year 2006. Return 
on assets (ROA) was the proxy for financial 
performance, and non-performing assets ratio 
(NPAR) was the proxy for loan quality. ROA 
represents the ratio of operating income to 
total assets, and it reflects overall firm 
performance. NPAR is the ratio of loans 
already in default to total assets. 
Sample, data collection, and analysis method 
The sample consisted of banks listed on the 
London Stock Exchange (UK Listed and 
Overseas Listed) as of December 31, 2005. 
The list, consisting of 44 banks, was obtained 
from historical data published on the LSE 
website (www.londonstockexchange.com). 
The list was cross-referenced with the 
corresponding list as of December 31, 2006. 
Five banks were excluded because they were 
unlisted. In addition, two banks were inactive, 
and five others were excluded because of 
difficulty collecting data. The final sample 
therefore consisted of 32 banks. Data on 
financial variables (2006) came from the 
Bankscope database. Corporate governance 
variables came directly from bank reports and 
accounts for 2005. As per Larcker et al. 
(2007), we standardized the governance 
variables. We then calculated the attributes by 
taking the average of the standardized 
variables. 
We used fuzzy-set QCA to identify the causal 
conditions that lead to good financial 
performance and high loan quality. Set-
theoretic analysis identifies causal patterns by 
examining the relationships between subsets. 
This method uses Boolean algebra and 
algorithms to reduce a high number of 
complex causal conditions to a small group of 
configurations that lead to a certain outcome. 
The software used in this analysis was fsQCA 
2.5, which provided an output listing the 
complex, parsimonious, and intermediate 
solutions. Rioux and Ragin (2009) argue that 
the intermediate solution has considerable 
benefits over the other solutions. 
We calibrated the original variables and 
factors by taking the average as the point of 
maximum ambiguity (cross-over point) and 
the percentiles 0.05 and 0.95 as the thresholds 
for full non-membership and full membership, 
respectively. After calibration (Crilly et al., 
2012), we replaced the 0.5 value of maximum 
ambiguity with 0.499. 
Findings by Larcker et al. (2007), Grove et al. 
(2011), and Felício et al. (2014) support the 
validity of the corporate governance factors in 
the model. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
Different combinations of attributes led to 
strong financial performance and high loan 
quality. Based on the four governance 
attributes, the maximum number of 
combinations was 16, although some of these 
combinations may not have been covered by 
empirical cases in this sample—these were the 
logical remainders excluded from the analysis 
(Feurer et al., 2015; Fiss, 2011; Ragin, 2008). 
The results also confirm the presence (or 
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absence) of core and peripheral conditions in 
the combinations that led to the outcomes. 
Financial performance: return on assets 
(ROA)The consistency cutoff for ROA was 
0.84. This value was used to separate cases 
belonging to the solution from those not 
belonging to the solution. The parsimonious 
and intermediate solutions (Table 1) are 
presented using the notation employed by 
Crilly et al. (2012) and Ragin and Fiss (2008). 
Table 1 
Configurations leading to strong financial performance 
Solution 
1a 1b 1c 2 3 
Block ● ● ● 
Board size ○ ○ ○ 
Affiliated ○ ○ ●
Busy directors ○ ● ○
Consistency 0.86 0.81 0.84 0.85 0.93 
Raw coverage 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.43 0.33 
Unique coverage 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.08 0.03 
Overall solution coverage 0.84 
Overall solution consistency 0.80 
Note: ● = core causal condition present; ● = peripheral causal condition present; ○ = core causal
condition absent; ○ = peripheral causal condition absent. 
Table 1 reports three solutions. The first 
solution had three neutral permutations. 
Therefore, results show the equifinality of 
first-order (or across-type) and second-order 
(or within-type) solutions. The overall 
solution coverage was 0.84, and the solution 
consistency was 0.80. 
Solution 1a shows that the combination 
between small boards (core condition) and 
less busy directors led to strong financial 
performance (i.e., ROA). Similarly, small 
boards (core condition) consisting of non-
affiliated members (solution 1b) also led to 
strong financial performance. Finally, the 
absence of large boards (core condition) 
combined with the presence of blockholders 
(solution 1c) yielded strong financial 
performance. Solution 2 shows that the 
presence of blockholders (core condition) and 
busy directors (core condition) combined with 
the absence of affiliated directors led to strong 
financial performance. Finally, solution 3 
shows that the combination of presence of 
blockholders, presence of affiliated directors 
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(both core conditions), and absence of busy 
directors yielded strong financial 
performance. 
Loan quality: non-performing assets ratio 
Unlike for financial performance, we used the 
negation of the non-performing assets ratio to 
imply a high loan quality. This approach was 
similar to that employed by Grove et al. 
(2011), who used the inverse of the non-
performing assets ratio. The consistency 
cutoff in the truth table was 0.84. Table 2 
shows the parsimonious and intermediate 
solutions. 
Table 2 
Configurations for loan quality 
Note: ● = core causal condition present; ● = peripheral causal condition present; ○ = core causal
condition absent; ○ = peripheral causal condition absent. 
Table 2 shows the existence of three solutions, 
the last of which had two neutral permutations. 
Table 2 therefore shows the equifinality of 
first-order (or across-type) and second-order 
(or within-type) solutions. The overall 
solution coverage was 0.63, and the solution 
consistency was 0.80. The consistency values 
for the financial performance and loan quality 
solutions were similar, but the lower solution 
coverage of the loan quality solution implies 
that the percentage of member contribution to 
the outcome (63%) was lower. Therefore, the 
financial performance solution is empirically 
more powerful (Crilly et al., 2012). 
Solution 1 shows that the presence of 
blockholders combined with the absence of 
busy directors (both core conditions) led to 
high loan quality. Solution 2 shows that the 
combination of the absence of blockholders, a 
small board (core conditions), and the absence 
of affiliated directors led to high loan quality. 
Finally, solution 3a shows that the core 
condition of presence of affiliated directors 
combined with the absence of busy directors 
led to high loan quality. Solution 3b shows 
that the presence of affiliated directors (core 
condition) combined with the presence of 
blockholders and a small board led to high 
loan quality. 
Solution 
1 2 3a 3b 
Block ● ○ ● 
Board size ○ ○ 
Affiliated ○ ● ● 
Busy directors ○ ○
Consistency 0.82 0.88 0.83 0.83 
Raw coverage 0.46 0.32 0.31 0.25 
Unique coverage 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Overall solution coverage 0.63 
Overall solution consistency 0.80 
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DISCUSSION 
Our findings highlight the importance of 
corporate governance attributes in achieving 
strong financial performance and ensuring 
high loan quality. Different solutions yielded 
similar results, a finding which implies that 
effects vary according to context or 
complementarities between attributes. The 
effect of certain attributes was enhanced or 
suppressed by the presence of another 
attribute. This finding highlights the 
importance of tailoring the governance model 
to each bank. Results confirm propositions 1 
and 2. 
The presence of large shareholders may 
mitigate the agency problem associated with 
shareholder dispersion and collective action 
problems. The results highlight the presence 
of blockholders in banks with the best 
financial performance. High loan quality, 
however, can be obtained through the 
presence or absence of blockholders. For high 
loan quality in the absence of blockholders, 
the bank must have a small board without 
affiliated members. Results support 
propositions 1a and 2a because strong 
financial performance and high loan quality 
can be achieved if blockholders are present. In 
addition, high loan quality can be obtained if 
blockholders are absent. According to the 
literature, the actions of blockholders 
increases shareholder wealth (Smith, 1996), 
operational performance (Larcker et al., 2007) 
and financial performance (Elyasiani & Jia, 
2008). 
Larger boards and board committees have a 
broader skillset, which can aid decision-
making, especially in banking, where products 
and services are complex and require 
specialist knowledge. Conversely, however, 
larger boards and board committees prevent 
coordination and may therefore hinder 
decision-making. Our findings show that 
banks achieve strong performance and high 
loan quality when large boards and 
committees are absent, thereby supporting the 
arguments highlighting the difficulties in 
coordinating large boards and committees. 
Results fail to support propositions 1b and 2b. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) argue that a 
large board impairs firm performance. 
Conversely, Adams and Mehran (2003) report 
that, in banking, large boards are positively 
associated with ROA and Tobin’s Q.  
Affiliated directors are expected to be aligned 
with managers. Hence, having affiliated 
directors may aggravate agency problems. 
Accordingly, both financial performance and 
loan quality should benefit from the absence 
of affiliated directors. Results provide 
conflicting evidence regarding the effect of 
affiliated directors on both financial 
performance and loan quality. Depending on 
other attributes, the presence and absence of 
affiliated directors may lead to positive 
outcomes. Propositions 1c and 2c are 
confirmed. In certain conditions, the absence 
of affiliated directors was associated with 
better performance and loan quality. 
Nevertheless, when combined with the 
presence or absence of other attributes, the 
presence of affiliated directors was associated 
with better performance and loan quality. A 
greater percentage of affiliated or inside 
directors on the audit committee was 
associated with a lower likelihood of an 
auditor issuing a going concern report 
(Carcello & Neal, 2000) and a lower quality of 
earnings (Klein, 2002; Vafeas, 2005). Zhou 
and Chen (2009) report that an independent 
audit committee is important for constraining 
earnings management with respect to banks’ 
loan loss reserves. The presence of affiliated 
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directors indicates the importance of specific 
banking industry knowledge. 
Busy directors have additional experience but 
may lack the time they need to perform their 
duties. Results reveal that the presence and 
absence of busy directors may be associated 
with strong financial performance, depending 
on other attributes. In contrast, the absence of 
busy directors was associated with high loan 
quality. Results support propositions 1d and 
2d, although, depending on other attributes, 
strongly performing banks may have busy 
directors. 
The loan quality solution had lower solution 
coverage than the financial performance 
solution. Hence, the financial performance 
solution had a higher percentage of cases that 
contributed to the outcome, which implies that 
this solution has greater empirical power. 
Grove et al. (2011) verified that corporate 
governance factors explain financial 
performance better than they explain loan 
quality, although they studied more 
governance factors than we did in this 
research. 
CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
In this study, we analyzed how different 
combinations of governance attributes led to 
strong financial performance and high loan 
quality in commercial banks in the period 
prior to the sub-prime crisis. For this analysis, 
we used the innovative fsQCA method, which 
identifies different configurations of attributes 
that lead to the desired outcome. 
Results show that the same outcomes can be 
achieved through different configurations of 
attributes. This finding challenges traditional 
approaches to the study of corporate 
governance, which yield blanket 
recommendations regarding the adoption of 
corporate governance practices. Furthermore, 
these findings explain why different authors 
have been reaching contradictory conclusions 
regarding the effect of different governance 
variables on performance. 
These findings contribute to the literature by 
showing the existence of different 
combinations of attributes and by highlighting 
the importance of combined effects that 
enhance or suppress the effect of a certain 
variable on performance and risk. Findings are 
thus helpful for practitioners because they 
show that different combinations can lead to 
strong performance, depending on the bank’s 
characteristics (e.g., shareholder structure and 
board set-up). Finally, for regulators, these 
results may challenge some recommendations 
on good governance practices. Hence, 
findings may encourage regulators to study 
the joint effect of some recommendations, 
thus helping to prevent unexpected outcomes. 
The benefits of these conclusions extend to 
other sectors because banks play a crucial role 
in financing firms, especially SMEs. Avoiding 
new financial crises and their implications is a 
major challenge for governments, regulators, 
and other stakeholders. 
Limitations and future research 
These results are encouraging in so far as they 
support the use of fsQCA to corporate 
governance research and offer new insight in 
response to unanswered research questions. 
Further research opportunities nevertheless 
remain. These include enlarging the sample 
and applying fsQCA to other sectors and 
governance variables. This method may have 
similar potential in corporate governance 
research on SMEs. 
In this study, we used governance factors 
adopted by other researchers, yet the same 
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approach may be applied to specific individual 
variables. We recommend, however, that 
researchers analyze non-linear relationships—
such as those discussed by Grove et al. 
(2011)—and seek the most suitable approach 
to address this issue using fsQCA. 
This study is rooted in agency theory and 
information asymmetry theory. FsQCA may 
also be useful for analysis within other 
theoretical frameworks such as stewardship 
theory or resource dependency theory (Valenti 
et al., 2010). Such analysis may provide a 
better understanding of the effect of 
governance mechanisms on performance and 
risk. Furthermore, it would be interesting to 
study other commercial banking governance 
mechanisms in different contexts. 
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